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ABSTRACT 
Upon reaching 15 years of service (YOS), service members must choose between the 
High-3 year average retirement plan and the REDUX retirement plan. This research 
analyzed retirement decisions of 89,884 retired U.S. military personal to investigate 
personal discount rates applied by individuals faced with this decision. The method of 
analysis was similar to previous studies of military populations by Warner and 
Pleeter’s 2001article in the American Economic Review and Hensel and Deichert’s 2008 
article in the Review of Financial Economics. 
This study found significant variation between the discounting behaviors of the 
officer and enlisted sample populations. Additionally, the likelihood of selecting 
REDUX—and therefore the personal discount rates—was found to increase with lower 
ranks, with lower education, with the presence of a race variable other than “white,” and 
with the presence of the marital status variable “divorced.”  
Eliminating High-3 in favor of REDUX would result in substantial cost savings 
for the Department of Defense. However, such actions are not likely to be 
enthusiastically accepted by the officer population, the more senior ranks, or the more 
educated personnel within the military. The large disparity between officer and enlisted 
financial behaviors complicates the implementation of a one-size-fits-all retirement 
policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Military Retirement 
Military pensions are “risk free, tax-sheltered, inflation adjusted annuities” 
(Hattiangadi et al., 2012, p. 2). However, all military pensions are not created equal. 
Upon reaching 14.5 years of service (YOS), service members face a decision that will 
impact all of their future retirement payments. According to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, they must choose between the High-3 year average 
retirement plan and the REDUX retirement plan on or before their 15 year anniversary 
(Department of Defense, 2012). The following are explanations of how the two 
retirement options function, as well as how and why the REDUX option came to fruition. 
2. High-3 Retirement Option 
Under the High-3 retirement system each year of military service is “worth 
2.5 percent toward the retirement multiplier” (Department of Defense, 2012). The 
number of years spent in military service then determines an individual’s overall 
multiplier. For instance, an individual who spends 20 years in service will have earned a 
50 percent multiplier (2.5 percent x 20 years = 50 percent), and an individual who spends 
30 years in service will have earned a 75 percent multiplier (2.5 percent x 30 years = 75 
percent). Ultimately, “this multiplier is applied against the average basic pay for the 
highest 36 months of the individual’s career,” thus determining an individual’s base 
retirement payments over the course of their life (Department of Defense, 2012). 
After retirement, an individual’s base retirement payment is adjusted every year to 
keep pace with inflation. This means that the High-3 retirement plan has “full inflation 
protection,” (Hattiangadi et al., 2012, p 2) which means “Cost of Living Adjustments 
(COLA) are given annually based on the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)” 
(Department of Defense, 2012). Table 1 provides retirement multipliers under the High-3 
retirement option. 
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Table 1.   Retirement Multipliers Under High-3 Retirement Option 
(After Department of Defense, 2012) 
3. REDUX Retirement Option
Despite a steady decline in force levels following the Cold War, the cost of the 
force continued to exceed what the country was willing to pay. This brought attention to 
the need to reform the military retirement compensation program. “The Military 
Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (MRRA, also known as REDUX)” introduced a change 
to the military retirement system (Christian, 2006, p. 7). Instead of receiving 50 percent 
of their highest three years of base pay, service members with 20 years of service would 
receive 40 percent of their high 36 months of base pay. This was achieved by altering the 
“multiplier used to calculate retirement benefits” (Christian, 2006, p. 7). Specifically, 
“under the new plan, members received 2 percent per year of service up to 20 YOS, and 3.5 
percent per year of service for each year thereafter up to 30 YOS.” Not only would the 
change result in a cost savings for the government (inversely resulting in a loss for the 
service members), but it would support the military’s goal to retain select service members 
beyond 20 YOS. In addition, the MRRA “included a change in the cost-of-living 
adjustment formula: Retired pay during the second-career phase  was to be adjusted 
annually by the CPI minus 1 percentage, with a one-time restoration of purchasing power at 
age 62, followed by CPI minus 1 percentage again” (Christian, 2006, p. 7). 
These changes did not last long. A strong U.S. economy throughout the 90’s had 
created “recruiting and retention difficulties,” and these difficulties necessitated yet 
another alteration to the military retirement system (Christian, 2006, p. 7). Upon review 
by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resource Strategy (DSB) in 2000 
the changes made by the military retirement program in 1986 were reversed. However, 
the DoD did not abandon REDUX entirely. Instead, the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2000 “gave members the option of reverting to the pre-REDUX formula or staying 
with REDUX and receiving a $30,000 bonus at 15 YOS for a commitment to stay until 
20 YOS” (Christian, 2006, p. 8). In exchange for the cash career status bonus, “the 
Years of Service 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
High-3 50.00% 52.50% 55.00% 57.50% 60.00% 62.50% 65.00% 67.50% 70.00% 72.50% 75.00%
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REDUX multiplier calculation and annual cost of living adjustments differ” (Department 
of Defense, 2012). 
The multiplier calculation and the annual cost of living adjustments are the major 
differences between the REDUX and High-3 annuity payments. However, to fully 
understand the REDUX option it is necessary to elaborate on two adjustments that take 
place when a service member who selects REDUX turns 62 years old. “The first adjusts 
the multiplier to what it would have been under High-3. For example, a 20-year retiree’s 
new multiplier would become 50 percent, a 24 year retiree’s multiplier would become 60 
percent but a 30-year retiree’s would remain 75 percent” (Department of Defense, 2012). 
Tables 1 and 2 are provided for clarification of this procedure and to allow for 
comparison between REDUX and High-3 retirement multipliers. Following the 
normalizing of a service member’s multiplier at the age of 62, full “CPI for every 
retirement year is applied to this amount to compute a new base retirement salary,” 
however, all COLA for all following years “will again be set at CPI minus one percent” 
(Department of Defense, 2012). 
 
Table 2.   Retirement Multipliers Under REDUX Retirement Option 
(After Department of Defense, 2012) 
4. Modernizing the Military Retirement System 
In 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed the Defense Business Board 
to examine short-term and long-term methods to achieve savings and increase efficiency. 
This resulted in comprehensive analysis of all DoD budgetary components to include the 
oft exempted personnel budget. This analysis ultimately led to the formulation of the 
Defense Business Boards recommendations for Modernizing the Military Retirement 
System. 
The board defined three shortcomings of the present system, calling it unfair, 
inflexible, and increasingly unaffordable. It was labeled unfair because many will serve, 
but few will reach the 20 years of service required to qualify for retirement, and the 
Years of Service 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
REDUX 40.00% 43.50% 47.00% 50.50% 54.00% 57.50% 61.00% 64.50% 68.00% 71.50% 75.00%
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system offers nothing for those who do not reach this threshold. The system was labeled 
inflexible because of the steep ledge it creates. Once reaching 20 years, many service 
members elect to leave military service despite the military’s need for their experience or 
expertise. Conversely, it creates difficulties when attempting to release personnel with 
more than 15 years of service for force shaping purpose. Finally, and the focus of further 
discussion, the present retirement system was called unaffordable based on forecasted 
increases from “$52.2 billion in 2011 to $116.9 billion in 2035” (Defense Business 
Board, 2011, p. 3).  
More recently, in 2012, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) revealed 
five alternative retirement proposals. The goals of the alternatives being; to save the 
government money, limit the impact on the force structure, and eliminate the unfairness 
of an all or none retirement system. Each proposal for retirement reform addresses one or 
more of these goals, however, continued research regarding the proposals impacts on the 
force structure is likely necessary before they can be seriously considered for 
implementation. 
The FY 2013 Defense Budget states that the DoD budget is “up almost 90 percent 
since FY 2001 (about 30 percent more than growth of inflation) while active duty end 
strength has grown by less than 3 percent.” Given the present resource constrained 
environment and the threats it poses to “training and modernization,” (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/ Chief Financial Officer, 2012, p. 1–5) the 
DoD has acknowledged that altering the present retirement system is a necessity. Unlike 
those who continue to endorse the status quo as a “good deal” for the sailors, soldiers, 
and airmen who stay the military course, the DoD has recognized the monetary 
limitations imposed by such a system—and the effects those limitations have on the 
DoD’s ability to “deter war and to protect the security of our country” (Department of 
Defense, 2013).  
5. Personal Discount Rates 
Personal discount rates can be explained as “the rate at which individuals trade 
current for future dollars” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 33). Said differently, a personal 
discount rate explains an individual’s perception about the time value of money. There is 
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an opportunity cost and a degree of risk associated with delaying the receipt of a 
payment. Although risk is multifaceted, individuals must trust that the money will be 
there in the future so they can be paid, and they must also trust that they will exist in the 
future to accept the payment. Opportunity cost is the amount of compensation expected in 
return for the delay in payment. This figure is usually driven by what individuals 
reasonably believe that money could have earned had they received it immediately vice 
delaying its receipt. The value placed on these elements varies across individuals based 
on their personal discount rate. This rate represents the factor a person, or group of like 
persons, (consciously or subconsciously) uses to determine the present value of dollars in 
the future. A relatively high discount rate results in a lower present value, or means that 
present dollars are valued more than future dollars. A relatively low discount rate results 
in a higher present value, or means that future dollars are valued more than present 
dollars. Neither is right or wrong, but an individual’s implied discount rate provides 
meaningful insight into the psychology and outlook of an individual or group. 
Naturally occurring circumstances and experimental studies have allowed 
researchers to gain insight into the factors impacting personal discount rates. For 
instance, discount rate patterns have been observed according to demographics such as 
race, sex and education. Implied discount rates have also been noted to vary according to 
the length of time over which a payment is made, the size of the payment, and whether it 
is a payment or loss that is being discounted. Evidence of time delays impacting personal 
discount rates were found by Benzion et al. (1989), evidence of differences in 
discounting behavior based on its size were found by Cylke et al. (1982), and differing 
discount rates between gains and losses were observed by Thaler (1981). 
An understanding of this information can be leveraged by leaders and policy 
makers in order to enhance the effectiveness of decisions; however, better yet would be a 
comprehensive study of the discount rate of the population aiming to be influenced. The 
feasibility of this varies. If a natural experiment does not present itself, an artificial 
experiment would need to be designed to gather the necessary data, and because variation 
has been found between discount rates measured through experimental means versus 
naturally occurring circumstance, findings based on an artificial experiment are uncertain. 
However, where possible a thorough understanding of how a population discounts future 
cash flows can be useful information when making policy decisions. 
  6 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research goal of this thesis is to identify the personal discount rates 
used by service members when choosing between the retirement payment options, High-3 
or REDUX, and to identify personal characteristics that made an impact on their 
retirement option decision. This is a continuation of the analysis conducted by Warner 
and Pleeter (2001) and Hensel and Deichert (2007).  
Unique to this study are multiple elements of the data utilized. One difference 
stems from the situation faced by the unique observations in each study. In the Warner 
and Pleeter, and Hensel and Deichert studies, the service members were being 
incentivized to leave military service prior to their retirement due to military downsizing 
efforts. In this study, the service members observed completed 20 years of service and are 
voluntarily retiring. Another difference in this study is the dollar value of the decision 
being made. Service members in the Warner and Pleeter (2001) study and the Hensel and 
Deichert (2007) study were deciding between annuity and lump sum payments worth 
approximately $25,000 for enlisted personnel and $50,000 for officers. The values of 
annuities and lump sums dealt with in this study are significantly larger.  
The values of the annuities in this study depend on the discount rate used. 
However, using a low annual discount rate of five percent, they range from 
approximately $301,000 for junior enlisted personnel selecting the REDUX option and 
approximately $918,000 for a senior officer selecting the High-3 option. Also, not only 
are the number of unique observations larger in this study than in the previous studies 
(this study uses 89,884 observations where Warner and Pleeter (2001) used 66,000 
observations and Hensel and Deichert (2007) used 3,241 observations), but this study 
encompasses all services. The Hensel study exclusively analyzed the Marine Corps and 
the Warner study omitted the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps. Finally, the period of 
time over which the payments will be made is different than the previous two studies. 
Instead of deciding between a lump sum and an annuity paid out over a period twice the 
members present time in service, the service members in this study are deciding between 
a lifetime annuity and a lump sum coupled with a smaller lifetime annuity. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE STUDIES 
1. Study by John Warner and Saul Pleeter (2001) 
Warner and Pleeter (2001) utilized data from a military draw down between 1992 
and 1993, when officers and enlisted service members were offered two monetary 
incentive programs to assist in reducing military end strength. One program offered was 
the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), which “provided an annuity to the separating 
members equal to 2.5 percent of annual basic pay multiplied by the member’s years of 
service” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 34). These payments would be made over a course 
of time double the length of their present YOS. The other option offered was the 
Selective Separation Benefit (SSB), which was a lump-sum payment of “15 percent of 
annual basic pay multiplied by the members YOS” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 34). 
Unlike previous studies which used experimental data or small sums, the study 
undertaken by Warner and Pleeter (2001) utilized “large numbers of individuals making 
choices over substantial sums of money, individuals whose earnings, education levels, 
and other attributes are representative of the wide spectrum of American society” (p. 49). 
The data between 1992 and 1993 differed because in 1992 additional 
considerations such as reserve affiliation, medical care, housing, moving expenses and 
civil service time transferability all favored the SSB option. However, in 1993 the 
“Defense Authorization Act authorized VSI recipients the same separation benefit 
package as that provided to SSB recipients” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 36). This change 
made for a more balanced assessment of discount rates because it meant the only 
difference between the options was that SSB was a lump sum and VSI was an annuity. 
Additionally, DoD prepared pamphlets, articles in service newspapers, and service-
provided counseling all potentially slanted the data. These educational outlets utilized a 
seven percent interest rate in their discounting calculation, and “at this discount rate, the 
annuity compared quite favorably with the lump sum” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 34).  
Warner and Pleeter’s study utilizes three probit models and three linear 
probability models, as suggested by previous discount-rate studies (e.g., Matthew Black 
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“Personal Discount Rates: Estimates for the Military Population,” 1984 and Harry J. 
Gilman “Determinants of Implicit Discount Rates: An Empirical Examination of the 
Pattern of Voluntary Pension Contributions of Employees in Four Firms” 1976), to 
analyze the payment decisions made by separating service members. The models divided 
data in three categories; pooled data of officers and enlisted, independent enlisted data, 
and independent officer data. The analysis also addressed potential differences with and 
without tax adjustments.  
Included in the models were the previously calculated implied break-even 
discount rates for each individual. This discount rate was called D* and represents “the 
rate that equates the after-tax value of the SSB lump sum with the after-tax present value 
of the VSI annuity” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 38). Perhaps more clearly, any person 
whose personal discount rate is greater than D* would choose SSB instead of VSI 
(Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 38). Table 3 presents those final discount rates established 
 










All 0.104 0.187 0.354 0.536
Stayers 0.099 0.182 0.35 0.525
Leavers 0.129 0.21 0.369 0.572
All in YOS
7 0.205 0.291 0.41 0.714
9 0.159 0.232 0.381 0.607
11 0.111 0.18 0.353 0.527
13 0.046 0.132 0.327 0.459
15 0 0.099 0.294 0.389
Officers Enlisted Personnel
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After establishing each individual’s D*, linear and lognormal regressions were 
performed to aid in the exploration of potential reasons for the variation in personal 
discount rates. The bivariate probit analysis performed utilized separation equations to 
“capture” the effects of policy and other variables such as: earnings capacity, mental test 
scores, race, sex, number of dependents, military occupation, branch of service, and age 
(Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 43). The authors then explain their findings. They break their 
findings up by officer separation payment choice and enlisted separation payment choice, 
and discuss the findings in terms of nominal discount rates established for: officer and 
enlisted service members as a whole, those who stay, and all those who leave by YOS (7, 
9, 11, 13 and 15). 
Within the officer separation payment choice data Warner and Pleeter (2001) find 
that race was a significant factor only in the sense that “compared with other nonwhites, 
blacks are more likely to take the SSB” (p. 46). Additionally, lower education levels, 
higher number of dependents, and service affiliation (specifically Army and Navy) all 
increased the “propensity to select the SSB” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 46). Warner and 
Pleeter (2001) also state that the two most significant factors in the officer analysis were 
the “the dummy for FY 1992 and the value of the after-tax lump sum payment” (p. 46). 
This finding demonstrates that the changes applied to VSI between 1992 and 1993, that 
made the rules associated with taking the annuity the same as the rules associated with 
taking the lump sum, resulted in significantly higher numbers of officers opting for the 
annuity instead of the lump sum. This explains the significance found in the FY 1992 
dummy variable. The fact that the probability of choosing the lump sum declined as the 
after tax value increased led the authors to conclude that there is evidence implying 
officers have lower personal discount rates for larger sums than they do for smaller sums. 
Additionally, because YOS had no statistical effect on officer’s separation payment 
choice they conclude that there is no evidence of officers preferring a payment that is 
received sooner over one received later, or, said differently, hyperbolic discounting was 
not observed among officers in their study (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 46).  
Results for enlisted personnel were similar to those among officers, though it is 
notable that as a whole, enlisted personnel “had a much higher average propensity to 
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select the lump sum” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 47). Race, number of dependents, and 
education all yielded results that coincided with the officer population. The authors were 
also able to use this population to analyze data regarding the impacts of test scores, which 
was not available for the officer population. Results from the analysis of test score data 
yielded results similar to those found in the analysis of education levels, where higher 
education levels meant lower discount rates. Similarly, higher test scores corresponded 
with lower discount rates and vice versa. Last, differences were found to exist regionally 
and by gender where they did not exist in the officer population. 
To conclude their analysis, Warner and Pleeter (2001) explain the mean nominal 
discount rates found in Table 3. Although the authors previously noted that YOS do not 
affect discount rates, discount rates do decline with YOS. They explained the fact by 
arguing that more YOS means those individual are also older, which does have an impact 
on discount rates. Similarly, with more YOS an individual becomes entitled to a greater 
lump-sum payment, which was also established by Warner and Pleeter (2001) to be 
significant in determining discount rates.  
Next, to address the “very high discount rates for enlisted personnel” the authors 
highlight two key factors (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 48). First, enlisted personnel’s 
lump-sum payments were on average 50 percent less than those of officers, and second, 
they have lower education levels as a whole, which is statistically significant in 
establishing personal discount rates (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 48). Last, by normalizing 
the data and giving enlisted personnel “the same lump-sum payment as received by 
officers, the same average number of dependents, and the same distributions of sex race 
and education,” the authors were able to analyze the effect of personal attributes and the 
lump-sum payment difference, which was determined to make up over half of the 
“estimated mean discount-rate” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 49). 
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2. Study by Steven Cylke, Mathew Goldberg, Paul Hogan and Lee Mairs
(1982)
The Cylke, Goldberg, Hogan and Mairs (1982) paper utilized reenlistment bonus 
data between FY 78 and FY 80 to analyze the impact bonus payment plans had on 
reenlistment rates, and to determine the personal discount rates of enlisted personnel. The 
data set of FY 78 to FY 80 was particularly useful in achieving this aim due to a 
congressional change in the payment of bonuses. Before “April 1, 1979, reenlistment 
bonuses were paid in annual installments,” then beginning “April 1, 1979, the entire 
bonus has been paid as a lump-sum at the date of reenlistment” (Cylke et al., 1982, p. 3–
4). This provided clean data for comparison of “one year under the old policy, one 
transition year, and one year under the new policy” (Cylke et al., 1982, p. 4). 
To “estimate the effect of bonuses on the reenlistment rate,” the reenlistment rate 










Next, two “specification equations” were introduced. The first utilized dummy 
variables “to capture the effects of time-dependent variables other than bonus multiple 
which influenced reenlistment decisions” (Cylke et al., 1982, p. 4). The second 
specification replaced the dummy variables with unemployment rate figures among males 
ages 25–34. Next, interaction variables were used between the specifications, allowing 
for a comparison to be made between the effects of bonuses on reenlistment rates under 
each period. The regression results found by the study are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Regression Estimates (T-Ratios in Parentheses) (After Cylke et al., 1982)  
Finally, by determining the “partial derivatives of the reenlistment rate with 
respect to the bonus multiple for each of the three fiscal years” (as seen in Table 5), 
Cylke et al. (1982) determined that the utilization of installment bonuses in 1978 
 were 71 percent as effective as the lump-sum bonuses utilized in 1980 (Cylke et al., 
1982, p.5–6). 
  
Table 5.   Partial Derivatives of R (dR/dB) (After Cylke et al., 1982) 





FY 79 -0.410 -
(0.25) -




Bonus x FY 79 0.0427 0.0329
(0.69) (0.76)




Specification 1 Specification 2
FY 78 0.044 0.046
FY 79 0.054 0.054
FY 80 0.062 0.062
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After establishing that the “installment bonuses paid in FY 78 were 71 percent as 
effective as the lump-sum bonuses paid in FY 80,” the authors proceeded to use this 
percent effectiveness as a means to determine the nominal and real discount rates. Utilizing 
a four year re-enlistment length they set the discounted present value over the course of 
four years equal to the already determined effectiveness of .710 and solved for the variable 
r. By doing so the authors determined enlisted personnel have a nominal discount rate of 
29.1 percent, which would be reduced to 18.5 percent after subtracting 10.6 percent, which 
was the rate of CPI growth during the period (Cylke et al., 1982, p. 8–9).  
 . 4




 + = −   +   
 (2) 
After accounting for the allowance of income averaging in a progressive tax 
system, the authors refine their estimate of enlisted personnel’s personal discount rate to 
approximately 17 percent and argue that “installment bonuses are inefficient relative to 
lump-sum bonuses” (Cylke et al. 1982, pg. 14). However, they acknowledge challenges 
associated with contract enforcement and the adverse impacts a lump-sum payment can 
have on performance. After comparing their conclusion with the 50–50 lump sum partial 
installment plan put in place in 1982, the authors conclude that although contract 
enforcement and negative effects on performance are relevant, the associated losses are 
not sufficient to justify installment bonus programs in favor of lump-sum bonuses (Cylke 
et al., 1982, p. 17). 
3. Study by Richard Thaler (1981) 
Thaler’s (1981) paper seeks to test normatively based economic theory that 
“individuals borrow or lend until their marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
today and consumption tomorrow is equal to the interest rate.” Thaler theorizes that 
discount rates vary inversely with the length of time and size of rewards, and also that 
losses are discounted differently than gains. 
To provide evidence for his theories, Thaler conducted a hypothetical experiment 
using data from 20 volunteers from the University of Oregon. Four different 
questionnaires were distributed, requesting students to assign the value they would 
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require to delay receiving a reward or paying a fine for a particular length of time. The 
values and times used are presented in Table 6 (Thaler, 1981, p. 203). 
 
Table 6.   Prizes and Fines with Associated Time Delays (After Thaler, 1981) 
The experiment appears to confirm Thaler’s theory that discount rates respond 
differently depending on sign. Observed discount rates were considerably higher for 
rewards than they were for fines. Additionally, the study confirmed Thaler’s theory that 
discount rates for gains would respond inversely based on the size and length of delay 
associated with a reward. Losses responded similarly, providing evidence that discount 
rates would decrease as the dollar value of fines increased; however, the effects observed 
when delaying the length of time to receive a reward were not observed when delaying 
the length of time to pay a fine (Thaler, 1981, p. 204). 
Thaler offers credence to the reader’s suspicion that these results are imperfect 
due to the hypothetical nature of the experiment. However, to support his methods he 
cites studies indicating that there is little difference between experiments where 
hypothetical rewards are used versus real rewards (Thaler, 1981, p. 206). He indicates 
how time, size, and sign might affect discount rates in the manner they do in his 
experiment. To explain time’s impact on discount rates he notes the “psychophysics of 
time,” remarking that the “difference between today and tomorrow will seem greater than 
the difference between a year from now and a year plus one day. Yet an exponential 
discount rate requires that these differences be perceived to be equal” (Thaler, 1981, p. 
205). He also offers simple mathematical error as a reason for the seemingly errant 
perceptions of value. He cites additional studies confirming that “exponential growth 
functions” are frequently underestimated. Therefore, he finds mere mathematical errors 
as an insufficient explanation.  
Amounts Time to Wait
(1) $15, $250, $3000 3 mo, 1 yr, 3 yr
(2) $75, $250, $1200 6 mo, 1 yr, 5 yr
(3) $15, $250, $3000 1 mo, 1 yr, 10 yr
(4) -$15, -$100, -$250 3 mo, 1 yr, 3 yr
15 
Thaler also offers two potential explanations for the size effects on discount rate 
valuations. The first is what he calls “an attractive self-control explanation,” where those 
participating in the experiment ascribe items to the reward values. For instance, a $15 
reward is a meal, a $250 reward is a stereo and a $3000 reward represents a used car. He 
concludes that the discount rates observed are more logical under the assumption that 
participants utilized this sort of reasoning (Thaler, 1981, p. 205). He also offers a 
“psychophysical” reason to explain the size effect, applying the “just noticeable concept,” 
which states that “for small amounts, the rate of return must be substantial before the gain 
seems worth the wait (Thaler, 1981, p. 206).  
Finally, Thaler addresses the sign effect. He notes (and references his previous 
studies) that opportunity costs (which are what those participants asked to value delaying 
a fine are assessing) are “generally not equated to out-of-pocket costs…[and because of 
this] tend to be underweighted” (Thaler, 1981, p. 206). 
4. Study by Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport and Joseph Yagil (1989)
Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1989) describe findings from an experiment 
conducted using 282 undergraduate and graduate economics and finance students at the 
University of Haifa and the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. Unlike other 
experiments, which utilized less “homogenous” test subjects, the subjects used in this 
experiment “were well familiar with the basic economic theory of discount rate and with 
the economic conditions prevailing in Israel” (Benzion et al., 1989, p. 274). These test 
subjects, Benzion and his colleagues argue, eliminate some “methodological 
shortcomings” in Thaler’s (1981) experiment. 
The study consisted of a questionnaire that included 64 experimental questions 
and 16 filler questions which were broken into 16 “blocks” of five questions. Each block 
contained a filler question and a question from four scenarios; Scenario A regarded 
postponing a receipt, Scenario B regarded postponing a payment, Scenario C regarded 
expediting a receipt and Scenario D regarded expediting a payment. For each scenario 
students were asked to assign the monetary value they would require to accept such a 
scenario (Benzion et al., 1989, p. 275).  
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The authors first calculated each subject’s discount rate for each question using 
equation (3). 
 (1 )tFV PV r= +  (3) 
Then the authors calculated means and standard deviations for each scenario. Utilizing 
“two-way analyses of variance (ANOVA)” the authors were able to analyze the 
significance of time and sum, and the interaction between time and sum over each 
scenario. Next, by using “linear correlations between the discount-rates across” each of 
the three “design factors” (sum by time, time by sum, and sum and time) for each 
scenario, they were able to conclude that “individuals maintained their relative position in 
the frequency distributions of discount rates.” (Benzion et al., 1986, p. 277). 
The study’s findings refute “the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount 
rate is uniform across scenarios, time delays, and sums of cashflow” and instead support 
Thaler’s earlier findings, that discount rates “(i) decline as the time necessary to wait 
increases, (ii) decrease as the size of cashflow increases and (iii) are smaller for losses 
than for gains” (Benzion et al., 1986, p. 282). However, Benzion et al. (1986) note that 
the discount rates they have determined are “more reasonable” than those in Thaler’s 
study (p.282). The proclamation that the lower discount rates found by Benzion et al. 
(1986) are more reasonable is based on the classical finance perspective of discount rates 
where the discount rate “is simply a measure of the relevant interest rate, and is 
independent of the individual’s utility function,” and discount rates found by Benzion et 
al. (1986) were comparable to the interest rates offered with Israeli bank loans (Benzion 
et al., 1986, p. 271). The differences between the two studies discount rates can be 
ascribed to the differences in financial knowledge between the test subjects, though 
despite the test subject’s superior financial knowledge there was still variation among 
personal discount rates (Benzion et al., 1986, p. 282). This variation is believed to reflect 
varying attitudes towards risk and varying levels of economic awareness (Benzion et al., 
1986, p. 283). 
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B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The papers reviewed comprise some of the literature on personal discount rates. 
Though the methods and findings of the cited studies are not identical, they are largely 
consistent. Whether through the use of historical data or experimental subjects (contrary 
to classical theory) time, sum, and sign were determined to play a role in how individuals 
established personal discount rates regardless of their background. The fact that these 
inconsistencies in classical theory existed whether dealing with sophisticated students 
of finance and economics, or a relatively balanced cross-section of the U.S. 
population— that is, the U.S. military—lends credence to the value of studying and 
understanding how people calculate personal discount rates in practice. Based on the 
findings in these and similar studies, the application of theoretical discount rates is not 
likely the most efficient decision and will likely result in costly miscalculations. 
Thaler’s argument for “an attractive self-control explanation,” where individuals 
contextualize rewards or fines by considering what a particular value means in their 
particular lives resonates regardless of the test subjects’ demographics. This concept 
could be particularly valuable for application to military populations because of the 
inherent diversity within the military population. Focusing on how service members plan 
to use their retirement could lead to a more cost-effective method of providing a 
retirement program that is “generous in recognition of the demands of military service” 
and affordable (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 1–5). 
The Benzion et al. (1986) study posed hypothetical financial questions to a 
relatively uniform population of financially educated students in the study of how time 
delay, cashflow size, and cashflow sign impact personal discount rates. The results 
regarding their impacts were in line with Thaler’s study. Discount rates decrease as wait 
time for payment increases and as the size of the cashflow increases. Additionally, 
discount rates appear smaller for losses than for gains. 
It would appear that only time delay and the cashflow size are relevant to the 
military retirement decision, and in terms of analyzing the present system that is true. 
However, when it comes to potentially restructuring the retirement system one option could 
be to allow (or require) service members to at least partially fund their own retirement by 
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contributing to a 401k-like fund over the course of their career. This would require an 
understanding of how discount rates are expected to behave with negative cash flows. 
Where the studies by Cylke et al. (1982) and Warner and Pleeter (2001) both 
focus on military populations, the Cylke study focuses on determining discount rates 
based on decisions between lump sum and installment bonuses for enlisted personnel. 
The Warner and Pleeter (2001) study also focuses on determining discount rates based on 
the decisions between lump sum and installment payments. However, this decision is 
conducted for officer and enlisted personnel being forced to separate from the military, 
and generally deals with larger sums.  
The discount rates in each study are critical comparison points for this study 
because of the similar populations being analyzed. Confirming or rejecting findings 
regarding the impacts of time and sum unveiled in studies such as those by Thaler (1981) 
and Benzion et al. (1989) within military populations is important to building the 
confidence necessary for decision makers to accept the utilization of such figures in 
computations necessary to effectively modernize military retirement. 
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III. DATA, VARIABLES AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
A. DATA SET DESCRIPTION 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided the data utilized in this 
study. The database they collected and provided consisted of 96,847 unique observations 
with 15 variables. The data is as of November 2012, and the retirees included in the 
database are those who have selected between REDUX and High-3 retirement and 
entered service after August 1, 1986. Service members who were medically retired before 
reaching 15 years of service were removed from the population.   
Before analysis began, the data was scrutinized, and adjustments were judged 
necessary. First, all observations associated with Reserve, Guard, Public Health and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were deleted. Public Health 
and NOAA were superfluous to the study’s purposes, and though Guard and Reserve 
components decide between REDUX and High-3, their careers were deemed too 
dissimilar from those of Active Duty service members for the purposes of this study. The 
remaining observations consisted of E-1 through O-6 service members from the Air 
Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard who chose between REDUX and 
High-3 and have entered retirement.  
More specific adjustments to the data included the deletion of illogical 
observations. For instance, age listings of 999 and below 15 were found within the “age 
at 15 years of service” category. Because such figures were obviously incorrect, those 
observations were deleted from the data base. The same logic was applied to the “age at 
retirement” category; deletions of this nature were minimized, and amounted to less than 
one percent. There was also consideration given regarding the handling of observations 
with “unknown” listed in response to variables. This was the case in the “number of 
dependents at 15 years,” the “education level at 15 years” and the “marital status at 15 
years” variables. While deleting the 1,698 observations with “unknown” responses in one 
or more variables was an option, it was decided that they should be included in the study. 
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After completion of the preliminary review the database had been reduced to 
89,844 observations. The data remaining appeared reliable, and though some minor 
idiosyncrasies remained (mostly regarding age fields), it was determined that making 
assumptions to attempt to correct these abnormalities or attempting to identify and delete 
them might do more to damage the quality of the data than to improve it, especially 
considering that they are less than 1% of the entries, and therefore not numerous enough 
to adversely impact future computations. 
B. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Table 7 displays the categories used in the study as well as the variables included 
within each category. Before the data could be utilized it was necessary to condense the 
variables within each category as well as create a Years of Service category and a Break 
Even Discount Rate category.  
Table 7.   Category list and Variables within each Category 
Category Name Variables 
Retirement Selection REDUX 
  High-3 
Gender Male 
  Female 
Age at 15 YOS ≤ 33 
  34–40 
  41–49 
  50+ 
Race at 15 YOS Other 
  Asian 
  Black or African American 
  White 
 Unknown 
Marital Status at 15 YOS Never Married 
  Divorced 
  Married 
  Unknown 
 Continued on next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Dependents at 15 YOS Has dependents 
  No dependents 
Service at 15 YOS Air Force 
  Army 
  Coast Guard 
  Marine Corps 
  Navy 
Total Years of Service* Total years of service served. Calculated 
by: (Age at retirement - Age at entry into 
service) 
Pay Grade at 15 YOS Officer (O1-O6) 
  Enlisted (E1-E9) 
  Junior Enlisted (E1-E6) 
  Senior Enlisted (E7-E9) 
  Warrant Officer (W1-W4) 
  Junior Officer (O1-O4) 
  Senior Officer (O5-O6) 
AFQT Score at 15 YOS < 31 
  31–64 
  65–92 
  93–99 
Education Level at 15 YOS Non-high school graduate 
  High school Diploma 
  Occupational program certificate 
  Associate degree 
  Baccalaureate degree 
  Doctorate degree 
  Unknown 
Break-Even Discount Rate* Junior Enlisted=.109 
  Senior Enlisted=.151 
  Warrant Officer=.163 
  Junior Officer=.153 
  Senior Officer=.199 
* These Categories and their variables were derived. They were not 
originally provided by DMDC. 
The data set provided by DMDC originally included 21 data categories. However, 
only 14 of the categories were used in this study. Categories referencing data at the time 
of individual’s retirement were not relevant to the studies goals. Additionally, data 
provided regarding observation’s occupations during service was presented using service 
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specific codes. Deciphering and translating each individual code was impractical, 
therefore this category was disregarded. However, if the codes were meaningfully 
translated this category could provide interesting data for use in future research. 
Categories with numeric variables (Age at 15 YOS and AFQT Score at 15 YOS) 
were condensed to create four variables representing different cross sections of the 
category. This process was void of assumptions compared to what was required to 
effectively condense the categories containing non-numeric variables. The only numeric 
category handled differently was the Number of Dependents at 15 YOS category. Instead 
of separating the category into dependent number groupings the category was separated 
into two variables; has dependents and no dependents.  
The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is comprised of four out of the nine 
tests include in the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB 
tests included in the AFQT are; paragraph comprehension, word knowledge, mathematics 
knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning. The test is only relevant to enlisted personnel and 
“is used by all of the Services to determine if an applicant is eligible for the military” 
(ASVAB, n.d.).  
The Race at 15 YOS category originally included 29 variables. This level of 
granularity within the category would degrade the quality of analysis; therefore the 
variables were condensed into five variables. The “other” variable is comprised of two 
overarching variables; American Indian/Alaskan Native Variable and Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander. The American Indian/Alaskan Native variable is comprised of 12 
variables, each of which were slightly different from one another, including various other 
races within their description; however, they all shared the American Indian/Alaska 
Native and were therefore grouped accordingly. The Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
variable is also comprised of one other variable which was merged in the same fashion as 
the American Indian/Alaskan Native variable. The same method was utilized for the 
Asian variable, which is comprised of seven other variables, and the Black of African 
American variable, which is comprised of three other variables. Table 8 displays all the 
original variables and the variable into which they were condensed. 
 
  23 
Table 8.   Race Variables Condensed 
Original Variables Condensed Variable 
American Indian/Alaska Native   
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian   
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African 
American 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African 
American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, White 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African 
American, White 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander, White 
Other Race 
American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, White   
American Indian/Alaska Native, Black or African American   
American Indian/Alaska Native, Black or African American, 
White 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander, White 
  
American Indian/Alaska Native, White   
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander   
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, White   
Asian   
Asian or Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander   
Asian, Black or African American   
Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander 
Asian 
Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander, White 
  
Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander   
Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, White   
Asian, White   
Black or African American   
Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander 
Black or African 
American 
Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander, White 




The Marital Status at 15 YOS category required one adjustment. The variable 
divorced was combined with observations that were legally separated and those who were 
widowed. The Pay Grade at 15 YOS category also required minor adjustments. Instead of 
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analyzing each individual pay grade, the category was split into seven variables the first 
two being more general variables of officer (representing the pay grades of W1-O6) and 
enlisted (representing the pay grades of E1-E9). To allow for more detailed analysis the 
variables, junior enlisted representing the pay grades of E1-E6, senior enlisted 
representing the pay grades of E7-E9, warrant officer representing the pay grades of W1-
W5, junior officer representing the pay grades of O1-O4 and senior officer representing 
the pay grades of O5-O6 were also created (see Table 7).  
Condensing the variables within the Education at 15 YOS category required more 
liberal assumptions than in previous categories discussed. The Associate Degree, 
Baccalaureate Degree and Unknown variables were left unchanged, but the remaining 
variables have additional variables condensed within them. The Beyond Baccalaureate 
Degree variable is made up of observations with the following degrees: first professional 
degree, post-master’s degree, post-doctorate degree, master’s degree, and doctorate 
degree. The High School Diploma variable is comprised of observations with the 
following variables: home study diploma and correspondence school diploma. The Non-
high School Graduate variable consists of the following variables: high school certificate 
of attendance, attending high school senior, secondary school credential near completion, 
and completed one semester of college no high school diploma. The Occupational 
Program Certificate variable includes the following variables: professional nursing 
diploma, test based equivalency diploma GED Certificate ANG challenge program, and 
adult education diploma.  
Note that while assumptions were made to condense the number of variables in 
each category, many of the variables that were enfolded into another variable contained 
relatively few observations. For instance the Professional Nursing Diploma variable, 
which was condensed into the Occupational Program Certificate variable, only contained 
four observations. The limited number of observations contained in these variables limits 
the statistical impact of such manipulations.  
Beyond condensing variables, the Total Years of Service category and Break 
Even Discount Rate category needed to be created. The creation of the Total Years of 
Service category was accomplished by subtracting the observations age at entry into 
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service from age at retirement. The creation of the Break-Even Discount Rate category 
begins with a number of estimations made for each pay grade variable. First, the average 
annual income for each pay grade variable was calculated based on the 2012 military pay 
scale. From this, the average annual income for those accepting the $30,000 REDUX 
bonus was also calculated (average annual income + $30,000). These average annual 
income calculations were then used to estimate the effective tax rate for salaries and the 
marginal tax rate for the REDUX bonus. These calculations vary widely by individuals 
based on a wide range of factors which could not be considered for each observation. 
Instead, a general effective tax rate was established for each pay grade variable. The 
effective tax rate used to adjust monthly retirement salaries was 15 percent for junior 
officers, junior enlisted and senior enlisted, and 25 percent for warrant and senior 
officers. The marginal tax rate used for each pay grade variable was assumed to be .03 
greater for each variable. Therefore, the tax rate applied to the REDUX bonus was 18 
percent for junior officers, junior enlisted and senior enlisted, and 28 percent for warrant 
and senior officers.  
The final assumption made to calculate the break-even discount rates is life 
expectancy—which was assumed to be 78 years in this study—and the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). The CPI measures the change in cost of a particular basket of goods over 
time, and is used to measure and adjust for inflation or deflation in the costs of living 
faced by households. For the purposes of this study CPI was assumed to be a consistent 
.035 for those selecting High-3, and .025 for those selecting REDUX (remember part of 
the REDUX retirement option is a reduced CPI adjustment of CPI minus .01). 
Using these assumptions, the initial monthly retirement payment was determined 
using equation (4) for High-3, and equation (5) for REDUX. The difference between 
these two equations is the percent of base pay received at 20 YOS. Those selecting High-
3 receive 50 percent, where those selecting REDUX receive 40 percent. At this point the 
calculations values were adjusted to account for the effective tax rate. 
 First Month Payment High-3=Avg high 36mo. Base Pay *.5*(1-   )Effective Tax Rate (4) 
 
 First Month Payment REDUX=Avg high 36mo. Base Pay *.4*(1-   )Effective Tax Rate (5) 
Next, the monthly values of each option were determined using equations (6) and (7). 
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Then, the values calculated in equations (6) and (7) were used in equations (8) and (9). 
This yields the present value of the retirement annuities for those selecting High-3 and 
those selecting REDUX at the age of 37 (which is the assumed 15 years of service mark 
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  (9) 
Last, to determine the break-even discount rate, the present value of High-3 and the 
present value of REDUX were set equal to one another as shown in equation (10), and 
equation (10) was then solved for the variable r.  
 PV REDUX = PV High-3  (10) 
This procedure was followed for each pay grade variable utilizing the appropriate income 
and tax rate assumptions.  
C. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 provides the frequency, percentage and mean (where possible) of each 
variable included in the study of 88,884 service members.  
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Table 9.   Descriptive Statistics of Sample Population 
   Officer & Enlisted   Officer   Enlisted  



























      
0.620   -  
  
8,578  
      
0.933   -  
  
47,137  
      




       
0.380   -  
     
617  
       
0.067   -  
  
33,552  
       




       
1.000   -  
  
9,195  
       
1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  










      
0.130   -  
  
1,608  
      
0.175   -  
  
10,028  
      




       
0.871   -  
  
7,587  
       
0.825   -  
  
70,661  
       




       
1.000   -  
  
9,195  
       
1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  
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767  
      
0.083   -  
  
27,177  
      




       
0.617   -  
  
6,863  
       
0.746   -  
  
48,565  
       
0.602   -  
41–49 
    
6,275  
       
0.070   -  
  
1,361  
       
0.148   -  
    
4,914  
       
0.061   -  
50+ 
       
237  
       
0.003   -  
     
204  
       
0.022   -  
         
33  
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1.000   -  
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Coast Guard 
       
634  
       
0.007   -  
       
43  
       
0.005   -  
       
591  
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Marine Corps 
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5,175  
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1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  
          
Pay Grade at 





       
0.679   -   N/A   N/A   -  
  
60,987  
       
0.679   -  
Continued on next page 
  
  28 





       
0.219   -   N/A   N/A   -  
  
19,702  
       




    
1,017  
       
0.011   -  
  
1,017  
       
0.011   -   N/A   N/A   -  
Junior Officer 
(01–04) 
    
7,579  
       
0.084   -  
  
7,579  
       
0.084   -   N/A   N/A   -  
Senior Officer 
(05 & 06) 
       
599  
       
0.007   -  
     
599  
       




       
1.000   -   -   -   -   -   -   -  
Marital 
Status at 15 








    
6,024  
      
0.067   -  
     
442  
      
0.048   -  
    
5,582  
      




       
0.817   -  
  
7,706  
       
0.838   -  
  
65,706  
       




       
0.116   -  
  
1,047  
       
0.114   -  
    
9,357  
       
0.116   -  
Unknown 
         
44  
       
0.001   -  
          
-              -      -  
         
44  
       




       
1.000   -  
  
9,195  
       
1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  
Dependents at 
15 Years   
 
     
2.54    
 
     
2.51    
 






       
0.875   -  
  
7,914  
       
0.861   -  
  
70,771  
       




       
0.125   -  
  
1,281  
       
0.139   -  
    
9,918  
       




       
1.000   -  
  
9,195  
       
1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  
Race at 15 








       
820  
      
0.010   -  
       
76  
      
0.008   -  
       
744  
      
0.009   -  
Asian  
    
3,759  
       
0.042   -  
     
183  
       
0.020   -  
    
3,576  
       






       
0.250   -  
     
869  
       
0.095   -  
  
21,583  
       
0.267   -  
Unknown  
    
5,355  
       
0.060   -  
     
427  
       
0.046   -  
    
4,928  
       




       
0.640   -  
  
7,640  
       
0.831   -  
  
49,858  
       




       
1.000   -  
  
9,195  
       
1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  
Continued on next page 
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Education 
Level at 15 











       
0.117   -  
     
245  
       
0.027   -  
  
10,259  
       
0.127   -  
Baccalaureate 
degree 
    
7,889  
       
0.088   -  
  
3,701  
       
0.403   -  
    
4,188  
       




    
4,819  
       
0.054   -  
  
4,413  
       
0.480   -  
       
406  
       





       
0.696   -  
     
366  
       
0.040   -  
  
62,215  
       




    
1,395  
       
0.016   -  
     
349  
       
0.038   -  
    
1,046  
       




    
1,265  
       
0.014   -  
       
14  
       
0.002   -  
    
1,251  
       
0.016   -  
Unknown 
    
1,431  
       
0.016   -  
     
107  
       
0.012   -  
    
1,324  
       




       
1.000   -  
  
9,195  
       
1.000   -  
  
80,689  
       
1.000   -  






   
60.98  
Less than 31  N/A   N/A   -   N/A   N/A   -  
    
3,602  
      
0.046   -  
31–64  N/A   N/A   -   N/A   N/A   -  
  
41,669  
       
0.532   -  
65–92  N/A   N/A   -   N/A   N/A   -  
  
25,931  
       
0.331   -  
93–99  N/A   N/A   -   N/A   N/A   -  
    
7,148  
       
0.091   -  
Total  N/A   N/A   -   N/A   N/A   -  
  
78,350  
       
1.000   -  
2. Analysis of Sample Population’s Descriptive Statistics  
Males make up a large portion of the data set making up 87.1 percent of the total 
population with similar percentages found in the officer and enlisted populations. Of the 
entire population nearly 93 percent were below the age of 40 when they reached 15 YOS. 
As expected, the sample enlisted population is younger with 34 percent below the age of 
34 versus only eight percent below the age of 34 in the sample officer population. The 
predominant race among the observations is white, which represent 64 percent of the data 
set, followed by 25 percent being Black or African American, six percent unknown and 
four percent Asian. The percentages found in the officer and enlisted populations are not 
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equivalent in regards to race. The enlisted population is 62 percent white, the officer 
population is 83 percent White; the enlisted population is 27 percent Black or African 
American, the officer population is ten percent Black or African American.  
Marital statuses among observations are more or less consistent between officers 
and enlisted. From a combined perspective 81.7 percent of observations were married 
when they reached 15 YOS, 11.6 percent were never married and 6.7 percent were 
divorced. The number of dependents category was separated by those with and those 
without dependents. Upon reaching 15 years of service 87.5 percent of those observed 
had dependents, and the percentages are consistent across the officer and enlisted 
populations.  
In terms of education, the officer and enlisted populations are different from one 
another. Overall the highest level of education achieved by 69.6 percent of the 
observations is a high school diploma. However, this is only the case for four percent of 
the officer population, where contrastingly, it is the case for 77.1 percent of the enlisted 
population. Continuing the trend, nine percent of the entire population indicates a 
baccalaureate degree as their highest level of education; this is true for 40.3 percent of 
officers and only five percent of enlisted personnel. Similarly, while five percent of the 
total population has achieved a degree beyond a baccalaureate degree, 48 percent of 
officers have. 
The percentages found within the Service at 15 Years category in this dataset are 
not representative of today’s force breakdown. Within this dataset the Navy makes up the 
highest percent of the total sample population accounting for 34.9 percent of all 
observations, followed by the Air Force with 29.1 percent, the Army with 28 percent, the 
Marine Corps with seven percent and the Coast Guard with one percent. The Pay Grade 
at 15 years category is largely comprised of junior enlisted personnel; they make up 67.9 
percent of the dataset. Senior enlisted personnel are second in terms of frequency at 21.9 
percent. This means officers only represent ten percent of all sample observations. The 
average AFQT score for those observed is 60.98 and 53 percent of those observed scored 
between 31 and 64. 
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3. Descriptive Statistics with REDUX as a Pre-condition 
Following analysis of the dataset’s descriptive statistics, it is important to analyze 
the same data in the context of REDUX. This allows for a better understanding of those 
electing the $30,000 bonus in exchange for a reduction in the value of their annuity 
payments, and perhaps more importantly, allows for comparison between the two 
populations.  
The statistics in Table 10 depict the observations, mean, and standard deviation of 
each variable given the pre-condition that those observations elected REDUX. The total 
observations represent the number of observations for each particular variable in that 
category. For instance there are 1,608 female officers in the entire data set. The mean 
represents the percentage of those observations who selected REDUX. For instance, of 
1,608 female officers 4.7 percent of them selected REDUX. 
Table 10.   Descriptive Statistics with REDUX as a Pre-condition  
   Officer & Enlisted    Officer    Enlisted   
































 REDUX  
  
89,884  























 Female  
  
11,636  
















 Male  
  
78,248  
















Age at 15 







 <=34  
  
27,944  




     
767  










 34–40  
  
55,428  

















    
6,275  










    
4,914  




 50+  
       
237  




     
204  




         
33  




Service at 15 
years          
 Continued on next page 
  
  32 
Continued from previous page 
Air Force  
  
26,156  



































Coast Guard  
       
634  




       
43              -            -     
       
591  




Marine Corps  
    
6,588  










    
5,175  




































       
0.428  
  
0.495   N/A   N/A   N/A  
  
60,987  









       
0.377  
  
0.485   N/A   N/A   N/A  
  
19,702  







    
1,017  






       
0.215  
  




    
7,579  






       
0.050  
  
0.219   N/A   N/A   N/A  
Senior 
Officer (05 & 
06)  
       
599  




     
599  
       
0.027  
  
0.161   N/A   N/A   N/A  
Marital 
Status at 15 







Divorced       
    
6,024  




     
442  




    
5,582  





































    
9,357  





         
44  




          
-              -            -     
         
44  


































    
2,926  










    
9,710  




Race at 15 
years          
Other  
       
820  




       
76  




       
744  
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Asian  
    
3,759  




     
183  




    
3,576  













     
869  






























    
5,355  




     
427  




    
4,928  





Level at 15 










    
1,395  




     
349  




    
1,046  












     
366  













    
1,265  




       
14  




    
1,251  












     
245  













    
7,889  










    
4,188  






    
4,819  










       
406  





    
1,431  




     
107  




    
1,324  











Less than 31   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  
    
3,602  




31–64   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  
  
41,669  




65–92   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  
  
25,931  




93–99   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A   N/A  
    
7,148  




4. Analysis of Descriptive Statistics with REDUX as a Pre-condition 
Before specifically analyzing each variable it is notable that the percentages for 
each variable are significantly higher for the enlisted population than the officer 
population. Note that in the majority of cases, though the percentages are lower, the 
officer percentages appear to trend similarly to those of the enlisted population. 
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Table 10 displays that the percentage of REDUX takers was consistent across 
services. The Coast Guard was the exception with less than one percent of their officer 
and enlisted populations selecting the REDUX option. Marine Corps officers also 
diverged from the norm. REDUX was selected by 13.5 percent of Marine Corps officers, 
compared to the next highest selection percentage of 6.6 percent by Navy officers.   
A combined total of 38 percent of the data set selected REDUX in favor of the 
High-3. Enlisted men took REDUX more frequently than their female counterparts. This 
trend was consistent in the officer population. The percentage of REDUX takers 
decreased with age in the enlisted population until the age of 50 where there was a very 
slight rise in the percentage of REDUX takers. This increase is difficult to adequately 
address solely using percentage data. The number of observations above the age of 50 is 
smaller (totaling 237 observations) than for the other age groupings. This increases the 
likelihood that the percentage increase is an anomaly rather than a finding indicative of a 
trend, which could be used to draw conclusions. Unlike the enlisted population, the 
officer population lacks an apparent age trend. The greatest percentages of REDUX 
takers were under the age of 34; 20.9 percent of them elected REDUX. This category was 
followed by those officers greater than 50 years old who elected REDUX 6.9 percent of 
the time. The 34–40 age group and the 41–49 age group followed, respectively, selecting 
REDUX 5.7 and four percent of the time. 
In the marital status category there are smaller percentages of REDUX selectees 
among personnel who were never married for both the officer and enlisted sample 
populations. In the enlisted population 32.5 and 19.2 percent of never married personnel 
selected REDUX compared to 43.8 of divorced and 42.7 of married personnel. The 
percentage differences are less than those found in the officer population. The divorced 
sample population is the only population that reflects a moderate increase from 6.4 
percent in the never married portion of the sample population to 10 percent in the 
divorced portion. Additionally, studying the race variables reveals that white officer and 
enlisted personnel selected REDUX the least, and black or African Americans selected 
REDUX the most. 
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The percentages found in the education variables are similar to the other variables 
in the sense that greater percentages of the enlisted population selected REDUX 
regardless of their education levels. For instance, 5.8 percent of officers whose highest 
degree was a baccalaureate degree selected REDUX compared to 33.6 percent of 
similarly educated enlisted personnel. Similar percentage gaps exist between officers and 
enlisted populations across all education levels. The percentages reveal a clear trend in 
the enlisted population. As education levels increase a smaller percentage of the 
population elected REDUX. The percentages in the officer population do not trend as 
clearly. A greater percentage of officers whose highest level of education was a high 
school diploma elected REDUX than did officers who had not achieved a high school 
diploma. However, overall, percentages of REDUX choosers are smaller amongst the 
more highly educated officer populations. 
The percentages calculated in the pay grade variable trended similarly to those in 
the education variable. Greater percentages of junior personnel selected REDUX, and the 
percentages steadily declined in the more senior personnel groupings. The same trend is 
not as clearly observed in the AFQT category. Though the percentage of REDUX takers 
decreases as AFQT scores increase, the percentage differences are small. Additionally, 
the percentage of REDUX takers for those with the highest scores is slightly higher than 
the preceding AFQT category. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY  
A. APPLIED METHODOLOGY 
The following explains the major steps taken to determine the marginal effects of 
each independent variable on the decision to choose REDUX. 
• Obtained demographic and retirement decision data from DMDC. 
• Calculated the present value of REDUX and High-3 across five pay grade 
groupings (junior enlisted E1-E6, senior enlisted E7-E9, warrant officers 
W1-W5, junior officers O1-O4 and senior officers O5-O6).  
• Calculated the break-even discount rates for each of the five pay grade 
groupings. 
• Using STATA, the probit model was applied to REDUX and the variables 
specified for the entire population, and separately for the officer and 
enlisted populations. The models output provides the marginal effects of 
each independent variable on the decision to choose REDUX. 
B. HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES AND THE 
SELECTION OF REDUX 
Table 11 annotates the hypothesized effect a particular category or variable has on 
the probability that an individual selects REDUX. The hypothesized effects are based on 
findings from previous personal discount rate studies. In some cases results from 
previous studies are mixed. In these cases, as well as in cases where past studies 
referenced have not used a particular variable, the effects have been annotated as 
unknown.  
Table 11.   Hypothesized Effects on the Probability of taking REDUX 
Variable Marginal Effect on the Probability of Selecting REDUX 
Officer Negative  
Enlisted Positive  
Gender Unknown 
Age at 15 YOS Negative  
Race at 15 YOS Negative among Whites 
  Positive among Blacks or African Americans 
Continued on next page 
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  Unknown among other minorities 
Marital Status at 15 YOS Unknown 
Dependents at 15 YOS Positive 
Service at 15 YOS Unknown 
Total Years of Service Negative 
Pay Grade at 15 YOS Negative 
AFQT Score at 15 YOS Negative 
Education Level at 15 YOS Negative 
The discussion of hypothesized effects to follow will attempt to justify the 
hypothesized effects for each variable in Table 11, and the effects are discussed in the 
same order as the variable listings in Table 11. Despite inconclusive, conflicting or non-
existent results from previous studies, an effort to hypothesize the effects of some of 
those variables whose effects are labeled unknown will also be made. This analysis of 
findings from previous methodologies will provide a foundation from which the results of 
this study can be compared. 
Before remarking on the hypothesized direction of effect on the selection of 
REDUX for each variable it is important to understand the relationship between personal 
discount rates and the selection of REDUX or High-3. It is recognized that such discussion 
is out of place; however, the placement is purposeful so the reader lacking academic 
familiarity with the topic can more easily follow the logic presented. The calculated present 
value of High-3 is greater than the present value of REDUX across all pay grade groupings 
as long as the discount rate used in the present value calculation is below that of the 
determined break-even discount rate. For instance, using a five percent annual discount rate 
the present value of High-3 for a senior enlisted service member is $507,485.29, compared 
to $595,356.16 for a senior enlisted service member who selected REDUX. For these two 
values to be equal an annual discount rate of 15.06 percent needs to be used in the present 
value calculation. This implies that those who chose REDUX have a personal discount rate 
greater than the break-even discount rate, and those who chose High-3 have a personal 
discount rate below the break-even discount rate. If this is true than the inverse is also true; 
those with high personal discount rates (personal discount rates above the established 
break-even discount rates) are more likely to choose REDUX. 
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Consistent with findings by Warner and Pleeter, the officer variable has been 
hypothesized to have a negative effect on the probability of selecting REDUX where the 
enlisted variable has been hypothesized to have a positive effect on the probability of 
selecting REDUX. Warner and Pleeter find that enlisted personnel have “very high 
discount rates” and “a much higher propensity to select the lump sum” (Warner & 
Pleeter, 2001, pp. 47–48).  
To better understand the population they were analyzing, Warner and Pleeter take 
their study a step further and normalize enlisted and officer populations so they would 
have the “same average number of dependents […] the same distribution of personal 
attributes […] and the same demographic characteristics” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 
49). They find that this brought their mean discount rates significantly closer to one 
another, concluding that “over half of the estimated mean discount rate difference 
between officers and enlisted personnel is attributable to observable demographic 
differences and lump-sum payment differences between the groups” (Warner & Pleeter, 
2001, p. 49).  
This is a significant finding, but despite the normalization, the other half of the 
estimated mean discount rate remains unexplainable by anything besides the enlisted and 
officer variables. Perhaps “the psychophysical concept of the just noticeable difference” 
presented by Thaler can be employed to provide an enhanced understanding of the 
unexplained difference (Thaler, 1981, p. 206). Thaler proposed that instead of thinking in 
terms of dollars people think in terms of how those dollars might impact their life. While 
a person might not be willing to wait to gain a sum they interpret to be equivalent to the 
cost of a lunch, they may be more willing to delay gratification for a sum they interpret to 
be equivalent to a car.  
To apply this concept to the enlisted population and their propensity to select 
REDUX, it is important to consider that many of their retirements are not sizeable 
enough to permit them to retire in the sense of the word that they no longer have to work 
to maintain their desired standard of living. This implies that they will need to find 
another job, and because of this, perhaps the difference between REDUX and High-3 (or 
SSB and VSI in the Warner and Pleeter study) is not noticeable because it will not have 
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an appreciable impact on their life. Either option they choose will require them to find 
another job and continue working, therefore, the delay in receipt of a larger sum is 
deemed the less valuable option. Selecting REDUX will result in their life being more or 
less the same; however, it comes along with the added advantage of a $30,000 bonus, 
which can be interpreted as one year of college tuition or a new car. 
The effect of the gender variable on the selection of REDUX has been identified 
as unknown. Results from the literature reviewed are conflicted in their findings 
regarding gender’s effect on personal discount rates. While Warner and Pleeter (2001) 
find no gender effect on discount rates or the propensity to select SSB or VSI in the 
officer population, enlisted males were determined to have higher discount rates and were 
therefore more likely to select SSB (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 48). The SSB is roughly 
comparable to REDUX in the sense that its present value is lower than the alternatives 
present value for any discount rate less than the break-even discount rate, which is 
generally regarded as a high discount rate. Contrary to these findings, Gilman (1976) in 
his article, Determinants of Implicit Discount Rates: An Empirical Examination of the 
Pattern of Voluntary Pension Contributions of Employees in Four Firms, finds that 
women had higher discount rates than men, which would imply the female variable has a 
positive effect on the selection of REDUX.  
Additionally, Warner and Pleeter (2001) remark that “because minorities face 
discrimination in credit markets they will face higher borrowing rates and therefore 
exhibit higher personal discount rates” (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 37). This study has 
applied the same logic to women, theorizing that gender discrimination (real or 
perceived) in credit markets and the work place will drive up women’s discount rates, 
thus creating a positive relationship between the female variable and REDUX.  
The studies by Warner and Pleeter (2001), Gilman (1976), and Black (1984) find 
a negative relationship between age and personal discount rates, and the same 
relationship was found in regards to income and education (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 
37). Likewise, in this study, age, income and education level at 15 YOS are hypothesized 
to have a negative effect on the probability of taking REDUX, that is, the older, the more 
income and the more education possessed by a particular observation, the lower their 
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discount rate is expected to be, and the lower their likelihood of taking REDUX becomes. 
Although this study does not have an income variable, the pay grade at 15 YOS variable 
can be interpreted to represent income. 
Warner and Pleeter (2001) find race significant in effecting the probability of 
accepting SSB, and that black’s (1984) discount rates were higher than those of whites in 
both the enlisted and officer populations (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 37). These results 
concurred with findings by both Gilman (1976) and Black (1984). This study expects 
similar results in regards to the discount rates of whites and blacks and their effects on 
taking REDUX, but is inconclusive regarding the effects of other minority race variables. 
The idea that discrimination in credit markets might impact personal discount rates 
among blacks has already been presented. The question is can this concept be associated 
with other minorities? Because of this uncertainty the effects of the other minorities’ 
variables have been identified as unknown. 
Marital status is another category with mixed results in past studies regarding its 
effect on discount rates. Therefore, the variable’s effect has been classified as unknown. 
Though results on the marital status variable offered little consensus, in the study by 
Warner and Pleeter, an observation’s number of dependents had a clear positive effect on 
personal discount rates and the probability of taking REDUX among both the enlisted 
and officer populations (Warner & Pleeter, 2001, p. 46, 48). Likewise, the hypothesis in 
this study is that the number of dependents variable will have a positive effect on the 
probability of taking REDUX. 
The effects of a particular service variable on the probability of taking REDUX are 
unknown. Though Warner and Pleeter noted a positive effect among Navy and Air Force 
Officers, no such effect was found among enlisted personnel. The Hensel and Deichert 
study only included the Marine Corps, but their finding regarding the combat arms Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) could be applicable in hypothesizing the effect of service 
affiliation. Hensel and Deichert find that being a part of a combat arms MOS had a positive 
effect on taking SSB among officers and enlisted personnel. It is conceivable that a service 
might have a positive effect on the probability of taking REDUX if the service contains 
sizeable populations of personnel with combat arms MOSs.  
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The years of service (YOS) variable is hypothesized to have a negative effect on 
the probability of taking REDUX. Warner and Pleeter find that YOS had no effect on 
payment selection for officers or enlisted as long as the size of the lump sum was 
normalized (this was necessary because the lump size of the lump sum payment was 
partially determined by YOS). However, the Warner and Pleeter study did find evidence 
that personnel had lower discount rates for larger sums, as did the study by Benzion et al. 
Given these findings, and the fact that the retirement payments in this study have not 
been normalized, we expect that because the size of an individual’s retirement payments 
increase as YOS increase, personal discount rates will correspondingly decrease, thus the 
likelihood of taking REDUX will decrease.  
The effect of the pay grade variable is hypothesized to be negative, that is, as pay 
grade increases this study anticipates a lower likelihood of service members selecting 
REDUX. Neither Warner and Pleeter, or Hensel and Deichert included a pay grade 
variable. However, the hypothesis that the pay grade variable will be negative is based on 
personal discount rate calculations. Personnel with higher pay grades were found to 
have higher break-even discount rates. This raises the personal discount rate 
threshold necessary to justify selecting REDUX. Because the threshold is lower for 
personnel at lower pay grades it is anticipated that it will be crossed more frequently, 
thus resulting in a negative relationship between pay grade and the selection of REDUX. 
AFQT score at 15 YOS is hypothesized to have a negative effect on personal 
discount rates and the probability of taking REDUX, just as it did in the study by Warner 
and Pleeter. Warner and Pleeter hypothesize that this was due to the idea that people with 
greater cognitive abilities are more able to process intertemporal choice (Warner & 
Pleeter, 2001, p. 48). An alternative hypothesis is predicated on the idea that AFQT 
scores are indicative of education levels an individual might be cognitively capable of 
achieving. Therefore, similar to findings on education levels in previous studies, this 
study anticipates a negative relationship between AFQT scores and personal discount 
rates.  
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C. THE PROBIT MODEL 
1. Decision to Use a Probit Model 
This study measures variables that might impact whether an individual takes 
REDUX or High-3, or said differently, whether an individual takes REDUX or does not 
take REDUX. The response is binary; therefore the preferred regression methods are 
either the logit or probit model. Both models work by transforming a sigmoid distribution 
(an “S” shaped distribution) into a more useable form before calculating the regression 
line. The models achieve this by “squeezing the estimated probabilities inside the 0–1 
interval without actually creating probability estimates of 0 or 1” (Kennedy, 2008, p. 
242). The decision between whether to use a logit or probit model is based on the 
distribution of the error function (ε ). “If ε  is distributed normally, the probit model 
results; if it is distributed as a logistic, the logit model results” (Kennedy, 2008, p. 243). 
Alternatively, linear regression could be used to model the relationship between 
retirement choice and demographics of interest. Linear regression is a mathematical 
method for determining a line of best fit for a set of data. Determining the equation of a 
line of best fit for a particular data set provides users with a predictive capability. Linear 
regression may be used for both continuous and discrete variables, however, its results 
can be difficult to interpret when used to understand a binary response. Additionally, its 
error results often suffer from heteroscedasticity. 
All of these factors contributed to the decision to utilize the probit model in favor 
of the logit model, or the linear probability model. However, perhaps more so than the 
factors listed, the decision to use the probit model was driven by the fact that this study is 
a replication of the study performed by Warner and Pleeter. Therefore, using the probit 
model, as they did, allows for more meaningful comparisons.  
2. Interpretation of the Probit Model 
The probit model’s predictive capability lies in what is called the latent variable. 
This is an “index of an unobserved propensity for the event of interest to occur” 
(Kennedy, 2008 p.243). The latent variable can be explained by equations (11–13), where 
x  represents the independent or explanatory variables and the coefficients ( β ) represent 
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“the impact of the independent variables on the latent variable [
*Propensity to select REDUXi ]” (Nagler, 1994, p.4). If the 
*Propensity to select REDUXi  is greater than zero, that observation is predicted to take 
REDUX, where if it is less than zero that observation is predicted not to take REDUX, 
and therefore to select High-3. 
 * 0 1 1 2 2Propensity to select REDUX = + ...i i i k k ix x xβ β β β+ + +  (11) 
 *Propensity to select REDUX 1  Propensity to select REDUX 0iif= >  (12) 
 Propensity to select REDUX 0 otherwise=  (13) 
The estimated coefficients in a probit model do not represent the marginal effects 
of changing the explanatory variables on the outcome. Due to this fact, they cannot be 
used as probability estimates on the propensity to select REDUX. To produce coefficients 
that can be used in this capacity, the derivative of equation (12) is calculated with respect 
to each independent variable (Nagler, 1994, p. 11). This translation is performed by 
STATA, and once complete allows for marginal effects to be interpreted the same way 
linear regressions are interpreted. Specifically, the marginal effects tell how the outcome 
changes if the explanatory variable changes by one unit, or in the case of categorical 
variables such as race, the change in probability of taking REDUX compared to the 
categorical variable excluded from the regression. 
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V. RESULTS 
A. COMBINED OFFICER AND ENLISTED PROBIT MODEL RESULTS 
Table 12 displays the results of the combined officer and enlisted probit model. 
The results were derived using equation (14) in the statistical program STATA. The x 
values in the equation correspond with the variables in Table 12. 
 * 0 1 1 2 2Propensity to select REDUX = + ...i i i k k ix x xβ β β β+ + +   (14) 
Table 12.   Combined Officer & Enlisted Probit Model Results 
Officer &Enlisted Probit Model (REDUX) 
VARIABLES dF/dx Standard Error 
Female -0.0286*** (0.00523) 
      
Officer -0.284*** (0.00661) 
      
Number of Dependents 0.0418*** (0.00124) 
      
Age at 15 YOS -0.00385*** (0.000595) 
      
AFQT Score  1.48e-05 (8.37e-05) 
      
YOS 0.00909*** (0.00117) 
      
Other Race 0.0107 (0.0175) 
      
Unknown Race 0.0272*** (0.00730) 
      
Black or African American 0.136*** (0.00428) 
      
Asian 0.0264*** (0.00885) 
      
Air Force 0.0461*** (0.00486) 
      
Army 0.0255*** (0.00450) 
      
Coast Guard -0.361*** (0.00237) 
      
Marine Corps 0.0297*** (0.00714) 
      
Continued on next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Beyond Bachelor Degree -0.172*** (0.0108) 
      
Non-High School Graduate 0.0759*** (0.0142) 
      
Occupational Program Certificate 0.0491*** (0.0140) 
      
Associate Degree -0.0549*** (0.00506) 
      
Bachelor Degree -0.0941*** (0.00678) 
      
Unknown Education -0.0392*** (0.0149) 
      
Never Married -0.0140** (0.00592) 
      
Divorced 0.0651*** (0.00718) 
      
Unknown Marital Status -0.00159 (0.0718) 
      
Observations 89,884   
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1     
B. OFFICER PROBIT MODEL RESULTS 
Table 13 displays the results of the officer probit model. The results were derived 
using equation (14) in the statistical program STATA. The x values in the equation 
correspond with the variables in Table 13. 
Table 13.   Officer Probit Model Results 
Officer Probit Model (REDUX)     
VARIABLES dF/dx Stnd. Error 
Female -0.00218 (0.00696) 
      
Warrant Officer 0.0662*** (0.0153) 
      
Senior Officer -0.00644 (0.0113) 
      
Number of Dependents 0.0128*** (0.00171) 
      
Age at 15 YOS -0.00201*** (0.000753) 
      
YOS -0.000714 (0.00137) 
Continued on next page 
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Other Race 0.0528 (0.0337) 
      
Unknown Race 0.000595 (0.0107) 
      
Black or African American 0.0654*** (0.0114) 
      
Asian 0.0229 (0.0201) 
      
Air Force -0.000230 (0.00728) 
      
Army -0.0177*** (0.00655) 
      
Marine Corps 0.0139 (0.00902) 
      
Unknown Education -0.00775 (0.0204) 
      
Non-High School Graduate 0.0782*** (0.0196) 
      
High School Diploma 0.0718*** (0.0218) 
      
Occupational Program Certificate 0.0423 (0.0755) 
      
Associate 0.0395** (0.0185) 
      
Beyond Bachelor Degree -0.0102* (0.00579) 
      
Never Married 0.0298*** (0.0114) 
      
Divorced 0.0527*** (0.0164) 
      
Observations 9,195   
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
C. ENLISTED PROBIT MODEL RESULTS 
Table 14 displays the results of the officer probit model. The results were derived 
using equation (14) in the statistical program STATA. The x values in the equation 
correspond with the variables in Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Enlisted Probit Model Results 
Enlisted Probit Model (REDUX)     
VARIABLES dF/dx Stnd. Error 
Female -0.0324*** (0.00562) 
      
Senior Enlisted -0.0614*** (0.00445) 
      
Number of Dependents 0.0433*** (0.00132) 
      
Age at 15 YOS -0.00395*** (0.000642) 
      
AFQT Score 9.80e-05 (8.81e-05) 
      
Years of Service 0.0117*** (0.00127) 
      
Other Race 0.00171 (0.0186) 
      
Unknown Race 0.0256*** (0.00770) 
      
Black or African American 0.133*** (0.00442) 
      
Asian 0.0184** (0.00926) 
      
Air Force 0.0361*** (0.00523) 
      
Army 0.0408*** (0.00491) 
      
Coast Guard -0.413*** (0.00298) 
      
Marine Corps 0.0370*** (0.00793) 
      
Beyond Bachelor Degree -0.0710*** (0.0241) 
      
Non-High School Graduate 0.0605*** (0.0159) 
      
Occupation Program Certificate 0.0504*** (0.0144) 
      
Associate Degree -0.0518*** (0.00546) 
      
Bachelor’s Degree -0.0720*** (0.00799) 
      
Unknown Education -0.0392** (0.0161) 
      
Never Married -0.0221*** (0.00630) 
      
Divorced 0.0622*** (0.00747) 
      
Unknown Marital Status 0.0105 (0.0757) 
Continued on next page 
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Observations 80,689   
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
D. ANALYSIS OF PROBIT MODEL RESULTS 
Before discussing the probit model’s results for each variable, it is important to 
note that nearly every variable was deemed highly significant. Only nine of the 67 
variables were not significant at the p<0.05 level, and 56 out of 67 variables were 
significant at the p<0.01 level. Given the large number of observations included in the 
study, this is an expected statistical phenomenon that renders interpretation of the p 
values less important, though not totally irrelevant, than they might be considered in a 
regression with fewer observations. 
The coefficient derivatives confirm the hypothesis that the categorical variable 
officer—would have a negative marginal effect on an observation’s probability of taking 
REDUX. In fact, the combined officer and enlisted model finds that officers are 28.4 
percent less likely to take REDUX than enlisted observations. Only the Coast Guard 
variable has a larger marginal effect on the likelihood of selecting REDUX than the 
officer variable. This indicates a preference among the enlisted sample population to 
forgo future dollars in favor of present consumption.   
The marginal effects of the pay grade variables in the officer model were 
hypothesized to be negative, that is, as rank increased the likelihood of selecting REDUX 
was expected to decrease. This hypothesis was confirmed. Senior officers were 
determined to be .644 percent less likely to choose REDUX compared to junior officers, 
and warrant officers were found to be 6.62 percent more likely to choose REDUX 
compared to junior officers. Though warrant officers are the lowest ranking in the officer 
category, their average salary is greater than the average salary of junior officers. 
Therefore, it may not have been surprising if the hypothesized results were partially 
refuted by the model. The fact that the hypothesized results were confirmed despite the 
mismatch between pay and rank presented by the warrant officer variable partially 
disputes theories suggesting that personal discount rates are dependent on the size of the 
reward. Other factors specific to the warrant officer observations in the sample 
population appear to be influencing their likelihood of taking REDUX, and therefore, 
their implied personal discount rate. 
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The enlisted model was also consistent with the hypothesized negative effects for 
the pay grade variables. Senior enlisted observations were observed to be 6.4 percent less 
likely to select REDUX than junior enlisted observations. The decreased likelihood to 
select REDUX with increased rank is difficult to interpret because of the other factors 
that typically change with rank. For instance, salary, age, years of service and even 
education generally increase as rank increases. Therefore, the values determined by the 
models in relation to pay grade are simultaneously affected by multiple untested 
variables. 
The effects of the service variables were identified as unknown prior to running 
the probit model. The variables’ effects on the probability of taking REDUX were found 
to vary across the three models. The only consistent finding occurred in the Coast Guard 
and the Marine Corps variables. In the combined model, the Coast Guard variable 
resulted in a 36.1 percent decreased probability of selecting REDUX. The variable was 
omitted from the officer model—because zero Coast Guard officers selected REDUX, 
and in the enlisted model it resulted in a 41.3 percent decreased probability of selecting 
REDUX. Contrastingly, the Marine Corps was the only service whose marginal effect on 
the probability of taking REDUX was positive. In the combined model, the Marine Corps 
variable registered a 2.97 percent increase in an observation’s likelihood of selecting 
REDUX. In the enlisted model, the Marine Corps variable resulted in a 3.7 percent 
increased likelihood in selecting REDUX. The officer model also revealed an increased 
likelihood of selecting REDUX; however, its results were not statistically significant 
below the 0.1 level.  
The effect of gender variables was hypothesized as unknown based on conflicting 
findings in previous studies. The results in this study do not indicate a difference between 
the propensity of males and females to select REDUX as great as the differences found in 
previous studies. In the combined officer and enlisted model the female variable was 
determined to decrease an observations likelihood of selecting REDUX by 2.86 percent 
when compared to an identical male observation. The results were also negative in the 
officer model, the effect was -0.218 percent and was not statistically significant based on 
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a p-value exceeding 0.1. The female variable in the enlisted model was significant, 
resulting in a 3.24 percent decreased likelihood of selecting REDUX.  
The results of the number of dependents variable were similar to those of the 
gender variable in the sense that the enlisted model’s results were amplified compared to 
those of the officer model. Consistent with the hypothesized results, the combined officer 
and enlisted model found that for each additional dependent the probability of selecting 
REDUX increased by 4.18 percent. The effects of the number of dependents variable in 
the officer model were a 1.28 percent increase compared to a 4.3 percent increase in an 
observation’s probability of taking REDUX in the enlisted model. 
An observation’s age at 15 YOS was predicted to have a negative marginal effect 
on the probability of taking REDUX. This hypothesis was confirmed, though only by a 
margin less than one percent. In the combined model every additional year of service was 
found to decrease an observation’s likelihood of selecting REDUX by 0.385 percent. 
Similarly, small negative relationships were found in the independent officer probit 
model and enlisted probit model. Following suit, the total years of service variable had an 
effect on an observation’s probability of taking REDUX. In the combined officer and 
enlisted model there was an observed 0.909 percent increase in likelihood of taking 
REDUX for every additional year of total service. In the enlisted model there is a 1.17 
percent increase in an observation’s likelihood of taking REDUX for every additional 
year of service. The findings in the officer model were similar, but more importantly 
were not statistically significant. 
The effect on the probability of selecting REDUX was unknown for the marital 
status variables. In all three models a positive relationship was observed between the 
divorced variable and selecting REDUX. The combined model found the largest effect of 
6.5 percent, and the results were similar in the officer and enlisted models, with increased 
probabilities of selecting REDUX of 5.27 and 6.22 percent, respectively. No clear 
relationship can be drawn from the never-married variable. It had a negative effect in the 
combined and enlisted model, but had a positive effect in the officer model.  
The race variable presented obvious positive relationships. In all three models, all 
three race categories (Black and African American, Other Race and Asian) had positive 
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marginal effects on the probability of taking REDUX. The largest effects were found 
within the Black or African American variable as observed by Warner and Pleeter (2001) 
and Hensel and Deichert (2008). Similar to previously discussed variables, the results in 
the enlisted model were more pronounced. In the officer model, the Black or African 
American variable resulted in a 6.54 percent increase in probability of taking REDUX, 
whereas in the enlisted model, the Black or African American variable resulted in a 13.3 
percent increase in probability of taking REDUX.  
Aside from the Black or African American variable, none of the other race 
variables—Asian, Other Races and Unknown Race—were statistically significant in the 
officer model. Additionally, the Other Race variable was not statistically significant in 
any of the models. In the combined and enlisted models, the race variables Asian, and 
Unknown Race were positive and significant, though their marginal effects on the 
probability of selecting REDUX ranged from 1.84 to 2.72 percent.  
The education variable was hypothesized to have a negative marginal effect on 
the probability of selecting REDUX, and the findings confirmed this hypothesis in all 
three models. The only exception was in the enlisted model where observations whose 
highest level of education is an Occupation Program Certificate were found to be 5.04 
percent more likely to select REDUX than those observations whose highest level of 
education is a high school diploma. In the enlisted model, non-high school graduates 
were 6.05 percent more likely to select REDUX than high school graduates, and 
observations with an associate degree and beyond were between 5.18 and 7.1 percent less 
likely to select REDUX than those with a high school diploma. In the officer model, 
those observations with education levels below a bachelor degree were more likely to 
select REDUX and observations with education levels above a bachelor degree were less 
likely to select REDUX.  
Similar to the effects of the education variable, the effects of AFQT scores were 
anticipated to have a negative marginal effect on observation’s probability of selecting 
REDUX; however, this was not the case. In both the combined model, and the enlisted 
model the AFQT score variable had a positive effect and was not statistically significant 
below the 0.1 level.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORMING MILITARY RETIREMENT 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects “spending for military 
retirement pay and survivors’ annuities will rise more than 30 percent over the next 
decade” (Schmit, 2013). To control this growth rate, the military is investigating 
alternatives to current retirement options. By applying a probit model to data containing 
demographics and retirement decisions of 89,884 military retirees, this study compiled 
and calculated statistics with implications for the reform of the military retirement. The 
data compiled presents multiple challenges in accomplishing the goal of reforming 
military retirement in a manner that is both affordable for the government—and 
acceptable to present and future service members. 
One of the most poignant obstacles unveiled by this study is the large disparity 
between officer and enlisted populations. While 41.6 percent of the sampled enlisted 
population selected REDUX, only 6.7 percent of the sample officer population made the 
same decision. The large incongruence in financial behavior between the two populations 
compromises the effectiveness of any one size fits all policy. This complication is 
magnified by the fact that the sample enlisted population was approximately 5.5 times 
larger than the sample officer population.  
 The CNA document, 2013 Retirement Choice, calculated a $387,714 difference 
between High-3 and REDUX for an E-7 retiring at age 38 with 20 years of service in the 
15 percent tax bracket (Hattiangadi et al., 2013, pg. 8). The high personal discount rates 
observed in the sample enlisted population coupled with the savings realized by the 
government when REDUX is selected suggests that the population’s preference for 
dollars today in favor of future dollars could be leveraged by the Department of Defense 
to accomplish cost savings.  
 By eliminating High-3 altogether, or by increasing the size of the REDUX bonus 
(which would likely attract more retirees to the REDUX option), it is likely that the 
Department of Defense could achieve substantial reductions in military retirement 
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spending. However, these options are unlikely to be enthusiastically accepted by more 
senior and more educated personnel, based on the fact that those populations were found 
by the probit model to have a negative relationship with REDUX. This lack of acceptance 
could result in an unacceptable impact on the force structure (Kalocinski, 2012, p.18). 
 The CNA analysis of the OSD proposal for retirement reform by James Grefer, 
Shannon Phillips, and Robert Shuford (2012) details five alternative retirement options. 
Each option provides a different balance of government cost saving, force structure 
impact, and reduction in “perceived unfairness due to the all or none nature of the current 




A “second career” DB component similar to the current system’s pension in that it 
vests at 20 YOS, based off of one’s Hi-3 pay, and is receivable immediately upon 
retiring. The annuity payments continue until the service member reaches 60 years of 
age, then the pension switches to the following “old age” component. 
B An “old age” component that pays a pension similar to the “second career” pension, vests at 20 YOS, and begins at 60 years of age. 
C 
A 401K type of defined contribution (DC) component with a percentage of 
government matching. Payments begin at 3 YOS and vest at 6 YOS. Withdrawal from 
this account is not possible without penalty until age 60. 
D A continuation bonus (CB)—based off of one’s basic pay—awarded at 16 YOS for officers and 12 YOS for enlisted. 
D.1 A transition payment (TP)—based off of one’s annual pay—that a service member receives upon retiring with at least 20 YOS. 
Table 15.   OSD proposals for retirement reform (After Kalocinski, 2012, p. 18) 
Given its scope, this study can only evaluate the potential impact of the OSD 
proposals from a force structure standpoint. The force structure standpoint means 
analyzing how changes to the retirement system could impact an individual’s decision to 
join, remain or separate from the military. Additionally, the relevance of this study’s 
findings are uncertain in their direct application to payment plans that differ significantly 
from the High-3 and REDUX retirement options.  
Broadly speaking, the probit model’s results suggest that more junior ranks prefer 
present dollars over future dollars. This suggests that the implementation of proposal D 
could be a reasonable alternative based on the suggested timing of its payment. Similarly, 
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proposal D.1 is in keeping with the REDUX scheme of providing an immediate cashflow 
with a one-time bonus. However, the findings from this study indicate that REDUX is not 
popular among officers. REDUX was selected by just 6.7 percent of the officer retirees 
observed, and by 41.6 percent of enlisted personnel observed. Additionally, the absence 
of the enlisted variable was found to decrease the probability of selecting REDUX 28.4 
percent. Dramatically increasing the size of the bonus will likely garner support for such 
a one-time bonus. However, because the officer population does not display the same 
preference for present dollars as the enlisted population, this approach is likely to have an 
adverse impact on the force structure, specifically that of the officer population. 
Proposal B and C both require service members to delay receipt of their annuity 
payments until reaching age 60. While potentially palatable for 62 percent of service 
members who indicated the presence of relatively low discount rates with their selection 
of High-3, these options are potentially untenable for the remaining 48 percent with 
higher discount rates. This is especially relevant considering Hensel & Deichert’s (2008) 
finding that “within the enlisted group, the average discount rate between combat arms 
MOS and the combat arms support MOS was statistically significant” (Hensel & 
Deichert, 2008, p. 75). Their findings were similar when comparing officers from the 
combat arms MOS and the aviation MOS. This may mean that military personnel who 
serve in combat arms roles also possess higher personal discount rates. It is unknown 
whether this is a product of their experience in a combat arms role, or a component of 
personalities drawn to combat arms positions. However, it is necessary to consider these 
findings when deciding between retirement alternatives that could alter the force 
structure. 
Finally, proposal A offers a mix approach. It proposes an annuity beginning at 
retirement after at least 20 years, and continuing until the age of 60. Thereafter, the 
annuity is replaced by a reduced annuity. This proposal seems least likely to significantly 
impact the force structure given its similarity to the present High-3 annuity which was 
selected by 62 percent of the observations. However, the statistics gathered in this study 
are not adequate to speculate as to how those who selected REDUX might react to the 
absence of such an option. There is no metric to measure whether the prospect of the 
$30,000 bonus at 15 years of service is what encouraged individuals to proceed with their 
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military career, or to gauge whether those individuals who selected REDUX at 15 YOS 
would have separated before reaching 20 YOS had REDUX not existed as an option. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, education levels 
impacted the probability of selecting REDUX, but AFQT scores did not. This suggests 
that intelligence levels are not the driving force in determining personal discount rates. 
Instead, more educated individuals might be gaining financial knowledge as part of their 
education, or the achievement of higher education is indicative of personality traits—such 
as patience—that carry over to financial decision making. It is possible that higher 
education levels contribute to better analytical research capabilities. Despite lacking 
financial knowledge, those individuals possessing higher education levels are more able 
to ascertain information regarding which alternative yields the highest present value. 
It could also be argued that studying personal discount rates is the wrong 
approach altogether. Drawing from the fact that the smallest service—the Coast Guard—
had virtually no REDUX takers and was the only service whose propensity to select 
REDUX was negative, perhaps the real issue at hand is peer influence on financial 
decision-making. There are numerous pamphlets, websites and reports available to all 
service members suggesting that High-3 is a superior financial option in nearly all 
instances. Despite similar information availability, financial decision making in the Coast 
Guard appears to deviate from the norm despite the absence of pointedly different 
demographics than the other services. 
Finally, perhaps through interviews, the “attractive self-control” concept 
suggested by Thaler (1981) could be investigated further (Thaler, 1981, p. 205). The 
theory suggests that individuals ascribe values to cash flows based on what could be done 
with the money. Understanding the manner in which service members intend to use their 
retirement payments—especially if transitioning to a lump sum retirement payment 
becomes popular—will help determine the amount that will maximize cost savings and 
minimize impact on the present force structure.  
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